CRIMINAL LAW IN BERGEN AND PASSAIC COUNTIES: MOTOR VEHICLE STOPS AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
In Chimel v. California, the United States Supreme Court analyzed the search incidental TO an the arrest exception to the so-called Warrant Requirement contained in the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution. In that case, the defendant was arrested at his home under the authority of an arrest warrant, but not a search warrant. During the arrest procedure, the police searched the defendant’s entire home and found items that were later introduced as evidence in defendant’s trial. After reviewing over fifty years of conflicting precedent on the search incidental to an arrest exception, the Court determined that the scope of the government’s search was over-broad and offended the Fourth Amendment. Resultantly, the court concluded that the evidence should have been suppressed. In an apparent effort to obviate further controversy in this area of the law, the Court decided to define the scope of the search incidental to an arrest exception and specifically ruled that at the time of an arrest, the government could search the arrestee and the area within his/her immediate control. The intellectual basis for this decision was grounded upon the court’s recognition that during the arrest process, an arrestee may attempt to use a weapon or destroy or conceal evidence within the arrestee immediate control.
Twelve years later, the Court decided the case of New York v. Belton. In that case, the Court returned to the search incidental to an arrest exception in the context of an automobile stop and concluded that once probable cause exists to make an arrest, the government could search the entire passenger compartment of the vehicle and its occupants.
Since that time, a majority of courts have concluded that the passenger compartment of a motor vehicle can be search incidental to an arrest, even after the vehicles” occupants have been arrested, shackled and removed from the vehicle. This seemingly myopic view of the practical underpinnings of the Chimel/Belton Rule (viz.to secure evidence and the safety of the police) has been expressly rejected by New Jersey’s Supreme Court. That court has specifically decided that once a defendant has been arrested and secured elsewhere, the prospects of destroying evidence or obtaining a weapon are eliminated and therefore, a search of a vehicle can not be justified under the search incidental to as arrest exception.
In the spring of 2009, the United States Supreme Court in a case titled Arizona v. Gant adopted New Jersey’s position on this issue. In addition, the Court in Gant concluded that a vehicle could be searched incidental to an arrest, only if there is a reasonable belief that there was evidence in the vehicle that was relevant to the crime that precipitated the arrest. This component of this court’s decision is very important because it can curtail pretextual motor vehicle stops conceived to allow the search of a motor vehicle to uncover evidence not associated with the original stop. Indeed, the Gant Court observed that “[i]n many cases, as when a recent occupant is arrested for a traffic violation there will be no reasonable basis to believe that vehicle contained relevant evidence. . .”
Frank T. Luciano, Esq., is a trial lawyer in Bergen County, Passaic County, Hudson County and Morris County with over thirty years of experience in the defense of criminal prosecutions with special emphasis in drug crimes and drunk driving (DWI/DUI) offenses.