Miranda Warning

Over forty-years ago the United States Supreme Court decided the case of Miranda v. Arizona. There the Court determined that before the police can obtain a statement from a suspect, it must advise the suspect that there is a right to remain silent; that anything that is said can be used by the government in its prosecution; that the suspect has the right to an attorney; and, that if the suspect cannot afford an attorney, one will be provided. The rule was based upon the recognition that an interrogation in police headquarters is inherently coercive because the environment is completely “police dominated” and as a result a suspect’s will can be overwhelmed. The Court also concluded that in order to establish a valid waiver of the suspect’s rights under Miranda the government must show that the waiver was voluntarily, intelligently and knowingly given. The Court characterized the government’s proof responsibility as a
“ high”.

Once a suspect indicates that he/she wishes to remain silent or to consult with an attorney, the interrogation must cease immediately. In those cases, where the government seeks to rejuvenate a second interrogation after a suspect has invoked his Miranda rights, a new level of protection is available. In Edwards v. Arizona the Court determined that subsequent efforts to interrogate a suspect in custody will be presumed to be illicit unless the government can show that a lawyer was present at the subsequent interrogation or that the accused “initiates further communications, exchanges, or conversations with the police”. If these significant factual considerations are not established, the court’s will presume that the confession is involuntary. The basis for the Court’s ruling was that subsequent requests for interrogations are infected with a “significantly greater risk of coercion” because of the police’s persistence in trying to obtain information from the suspect. The Edward’s rule had been applied where the subsequent interrogation related to a different crime; where the subsequent interrogation was conducted by a different law enforcement agency; and where the suspect met with an attorney after the first interrogation.

The Edward rule was revisited by the United States Supreme Court. The facts of that case established that the suspect in a sexual assault case was first interviewed by a government agent while in a prison on an unrelated conviction. When the suspect invoked his Miranda rights, the interrogation was terminated and the defendant was returned to the general population. In 2006, while the suspect was still incarcerated in the same penitentiary, another detective visited the suspect to investigate the same sexual assault. This time, the suspect made a number of statements that led to his conviction. On appeal, the defendant contended that despite the passage of time he was still incarcerated and the coercive influence that prompted the decision in Miranda and Evans was present and to that extent his conviction should be reversed because his confession was involuntary.

The Court initially observed that the Edward’s rule usually applied to circumstances where the subsequent interrogation occurred in proximity to the first, and where the suspect was under continuous custody. Where, however, a suspect was released from pretrial custody and returned to his home and normal lifestyle the coercive influence of police custody has dissipated and to that extent the rule in Edwards would not apply. Similarly, the Court found that where a suspect who is held in a medium security facility that allowed him to send and receive mail and to visit with friends and family, the “inherently compelling pressure” to cooperate with the government had dissipated.

In closing, its opinion, the Court seemed to provide a “bright line” rule that said that after a fourteen day break in custody the Edward’s rule should not ordinarily apply to subsequent interrogations.